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Passive Virtues versus Aggressive Litigants: The Prudence of
Avoiding a Constitutional Decision in Snyder v. Phelps*
INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work on the functions of the federal judiciary,
Alexander M. Bickel advocated what he called the "passive virtues"
of judicial restraint and the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional
decision-making.' The avoidance doctrine is a prudential principle
that instructs federal courts to refrain from ruling on a constitutional
issue if non-constitutional grounds exist to dispose of the case.2
Justifications for the doctrine are many, but often center on the "final
and delicate nature" of judicial review, the need to maintain the
legitimacy and credibility of the federal judiciary, and the "paramount
importance of constitutional adjudication."3 As Justice Brandeis
famously quipped, "the most important thing we do is in 'not
* @ 2010 Jonathan S. Carter.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-29 (2d ed.
1986).
2. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of."); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (endorsing
unanimously the avoidance principle as articulated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander);
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (refusing to reach a constitutional claim in
a controversial case because petitioners' statutory claim would provide relief and noting
that " '[n]ormally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other
ground upon which to dispose of the case' " (quoting Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466
U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam))); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (discussing
the avoidance canon in the context of statutory interpretation and noting "one of the
canon's chief justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the decision of constitutional
questions"). For a detailed analysis of the avoidance doctrine and a critique of its
inconsistent application, see generally LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How
THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW (2001).
3. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (1994); see also Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) (discussing the
various justifications of the constitutional avoidance doctrine); Thomas Healy, The Rise of
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 857 (2005) ("The principle of
constitutional avoidance has a long and distinguished pedigree and is grounded in the
recognition that constitutional interpretation and judicial review are delicate functions.").
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doing.' "4 Thus, avoidance is a fundamental tenet in the
jurisprudential canon.5
Against such passive virtues, however, must be balanced the
traditional precept that litigants are "masters of their complaints,"
wielding a great deal of autonomy and control over which issues to
bring before the court.6 The question thus arises: to what extent
should federal courts permit aggressive litigants to deliberately
manipulate the issues on appeal and thereby control whether a
federal court decides a constitutional question?
In Snyder v. Phelps,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reviewed a five million dollar plaintiff's verdict in an
action brought by the father of a soldier killed in Iraq against Fred
Phelps and his fundamentalist Westboro Baptist Church ("WBC")
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon
seclusion, and conspiracy after the church picketed the soldier's
funeral with signs stating "Fag Troops,"' "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers," and "You're Going to Hell."' The court reversed the
judgment, concluding that imposing tort liability contravened the
defendants' constitutionally protected speech under the First
Amendment.o In reaching its decision, however, the court specifically
refused to address whether reversal was warranted on the non-
constitutional grounds of insufficiency of the evidence." Although
insufficiency was raised by amicus,12 the court reasoned that because
the Phelpses only pressed the constitutional question in their
4. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 17 (1957).
5. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 49-
53 (3d ed. 2006).
6. Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1034; see also Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.
237, 243 (2008) ("In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on
the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter
of matters the parties present.").
7. 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009). The United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
8. Phelps's picketers were not accusing the deceased soldier of being a homosexual,
but rather "used [Synder's] funeral to spread their message that God is punishing the
United States for its tolerance of homosexuality by killing its soldiers." Adam Liptak,
Justices Take Up Funeral-Protest Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/us/07scotus.html?_r=1.
9. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212-14.
10. Id. at 226.
11. Id. at 216.
12. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Ctr. for the Protection of Free
Expression at 15-30, Snyder, 580 F.3d 206 (No. 08-1026).
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appellate briefs, the sufficiency issue had been waived and it was
therefore "absolutely necessary" to resolve the First Amendment
question to dispose of the appeal.13 Thus, the Phelpses' aggressive
litigation strategy, rather than the court's own prudential obligations,
ultimately determined whether the federal court would reach a
difficult and controversial constitutional question.
This Recent Development argues that the court's refusal to
consider non-constitutional grounds for disposing of this case was
unjustified and constituted an abdication of the court's self-imposed
jurisprudential obligation to avoid unnecessary constitutional
adjudication. As the defendant-appellants deliberately did not brief
the non-constitutional issues, the Phelpses were able to force a ruling
on whether their widespread funeral protests and anti-homosexual
demonstrations were protected by the First Amendment.14 By
refusing to apply the avoidance principle, the court effectively handed
over to the litigants the discretionary power to control if and when
the federal courts will expend their judicial capital in deciding a
constitutional issue." This poses serious dangers where litigants such
as the Phelpses, notorious for their long history of abusive litigation
practicesl6 and repeated proclamations that "God Hates America,"
"America is Doomed," and "Thank God for 9/11,"17 have
demonstrated little or no interest in preserving the integrity of our
nation's modern institutions, including the federal judiciary." Thus,
13. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217 n.9.
14. As explained infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text, Fred Phelps and his
Westboro congregation have conducted similar protests at soldiers' funerals all over the
country to draw attention to their message that "God hates homosexuality and hates and
punishes America for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in the United States
military." Id. at 211.
15. See Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1033-34; Amanda Frost, The Limits of
Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 471 (2009) ("[C]ourts must retain control of the interpretive
process and thus cannot cede to the parties the sources and arguments that will be used to
interpret statutory or constitutional texts, particularly when doing so could expand the
judicial role beyond its constitutional parameters.... An inflexible norm against party
presentation would threaten this judicial independence by giving the parties, and not the
courts, control over judicial pronouncements.").
16. See S. Poverty Law Ctr., Halting Abusive Lawyers, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring
2001, at 60, 60, 64, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informedlintelligence-
report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/halting-abusive-lawyers (describing abusive litigation
practices by Fred Phelps and others in the Phelps family).
17. Westboro Baptist Church, Thank God for 10.9 Million Verdict,
GODHATESFAGS.COM (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/archive/2007
1031_thank-god-for-verdict.pdf.
18. See Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1033-34 ("By not pressing nonconstitutional
claims on appeal, litigants can easily evade the last resort rule and force courts to render
constitutional rulings.... Litigants, however, will have no incentive (and certainly no
328 [Vol. 89
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the decision in Snyder reflected an abdication of the court's
prudential duty of self-restraint in avoiding constitutional questions,19
and it ultimately provided WBC the perverse opportunity to extract
from the court an opinion on the constitutional legitimacy of their
outrageous demonstrations at military funerals across the nation.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
the Phelps family and the controversial activities of WBC, including
its national campaign to picket military funerals in protest of
America's tolerance of homosexuality and to spread its message that
"God Hates America." Part II summarizes the facts and holding of
Snyder v. Phelps and addresses the general character of the
allegations that gave rise to the suit. Further, this section briefly
outlines the contours of First Amendment freedoms in the context of
civil liability. Part III addresses the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and, more specifically, the prudential "last resort rule"20
that cautions federal courts to avoid ruling on a constitutional issue if
the case can be disposed of on a non-constitutional basis. Part IV
provides analysis of the Snyder decision and argues, as Justice Shedd
did in his concurring opinion,2 1 that the majority was unjustified in
refusing to address the non-constitutional sufficiency issue simply
duty) to selflessly evaluate the institutional concerns underlying the rule, including
concerns of comity and separation of powers, in order to determine whether
nonconstitutional grounds merit consideration prior to a constitutional issue.").
19. As Justice Blackmun stated, "[T]he obligation to avoid unnecessary adjudication
of constitutional questions does not depend upon the parties' litigation strategy, but rather
is a 'self-imposed limitation on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction [that] has an
importance to the institution that transcends the significance of particular controversies.' "
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 16 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294
(1982)).
20. The term "last resort rule" was coined by Lisa A. Kloppenberg. See Kloppenberg,
supra note 3, at 1004 ("The 'last resort rule' dictates that a federal court should refuse to
rule on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.").
This Recent Development focuses on the narrower "last resort" component of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine rather than the broader application of avoidance
principles in the context of statutory construction. For a discussion of the canon of federal
statutory construction, see, for exampie, Alexander 1vi. Bickei & Harry Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8-9 (1957); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 839-40 (1991); Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1202-09
(2006); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 71-74.
21. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 227 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring) ("I
would hold that Snyder failed to prove at trial sufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict on any of his tort claims. Because the appeal can be decided on this non-
constitutional basis, I would not reach the First Amendment issue addressed by the
majority."), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
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because the Phelpses pressed the constitutional question in their
appellate briefs. By reaching the First Amendment issues in this case
unnecessarily, the court jeopardized its own autonomy and credibility
by handing over to the litigants, parties unconcerned with the broader
institutional legitimacy of judicial review, the ability to control when a
federal court decides controversial constitutional questions. Given the
"paramount importance of constitutional adjudication,"2 2 prudence
demands that courts be far more cautious of attempts by aggressive
litigants to out-maneuver the passive virtues of constitutional
avoidance.
I. HATING GAYS,23 LOVING PUBLICITY2 4: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH
Westboro Baptist Church is a self-proclaimed "Primitive" Baptist
Church25 located in Topeka, Kansas that advocates, to put to it gently,
a rather peculiar style of Christian charity.26 As its congregants
describe it, WBC's ministry involves staging "daily peaceful sidewalk
demonstrations opposing the homosexual lifestyle of soul-damning,
nation-destroying filth."27 The church's octogenarian pastor, Fred W.
Phelps, founded WBC in 1955 and continues to lead its congregation,
populated almost entirely by Phelps's thirteen children, their spouses,
fifty-four grandchildren, and seven great-grandchildren.28 On the
church website, tactfully branded "godhatesfags.com," WBC
expounds upon its anti-gay platform, explaining that the "modern
militant homosexual movement ... pose[s] a clear and present danger
to the survival of America." 29 As a result, WBC claims it has been
called to a "unique picketing ministry" where church members gather
22. Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
23. "Anyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has
eternal life in him." 1 John 3:15 (New International Version).
24. "Be careful not to do your 'acts of righteousness' before men, to be seen by them.
If you do, you will have no reward from your Father in heaven." Matthew 6:1 (New
International Version).
25. WBC appears to be unaffiliated with other Baptist conventions and organizations.
See Chelsea Brown, Note, Not Your Mother's Remedy: A Civil Action Response to the
Westboro Baptist Church's Military Funeral Demonstrations, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 210
(2009).
26. God Hates Fags, Westboro Baptist Church FAQs, GODHATESFAGS.COM,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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not at the river 3 but at the funerals of strangers, brandishing colorful
placards with crude slogans like "Aids Cures Fags," "Fags Doom
Nations," "God Blew Up The Troops," and "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers." 3' As a grief-stricken family's "sorrows like sea billows
roll," 32 WBC boorishly floods the streets with their outlandish
vulgarities to decry the alleged moral deterioration of our country.
Since 1991, WBC has orchestrated over 42,760 demonstrations "at
homosexual parades and other events, including funerals of
impenitent sodomites (like Matthew Shepard) and over 200 military
funerals of troops whom God has killed in Iraq/Afghanistan in
righteous judgment against an evil nation."33 WBC's tactics are
deliberately shocking, offensive, and extreme, representing a
calculated effort to attract international media attention and spread
its message to the world.34 From all accounts, the Phelps family has
enjoyed monstrous success in their ploys for attention: hate, it seems,
breeds plenty of press.35
30. See Robert Lowry, Shall We Gather at the River, in THE BAPTIST HYMNAL 518
(Convention Press 1991) (1864) (beloved Baptist hymn frequently sung at church
funerals).
31. God Hates Fags, supra note 26. WBC members also include young children in
their protests. See Kids with Horrible Signs Protesting America, Hockey, DALLAS
OBSERVER, http://www.dallasobserver.com/slideshow/kids-with-horrible-signs-protesting-
america-hockey-29219999/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
32. Horatio G. Spafford, It Is Well with My Soul, in THE BAPTIST HYMNAL 410
(Convention Press 1991) (1873) (beloved hymn frequently sung at church funerals).
33. God Hates Fags, supra note 26; see also Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral
Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/17/us/17picket.html (discussing WBC's protesting
tactics).
34. God Hates Fags, supra note 26 ("WBC teams have picketed all over the United
States, and internationally (including Canada, Jordan and Iraq). The unique picketing
ministry of Westboro Baptist Church has received international attention, and WBC
believes this gospel message to be this world's last hope."); Westboro Baptist Church,
supra note 17 ("Not only did you fail to stop our preaching, but our message has gone
forth to the ENTIRE WORLD this day, because of your folly, like never before!").
35. See, e.g., Westboro Baptist Church: A Publicity-Hungry Group, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.adl.org/learnlext-us/WBC/publicity.asp?LEARN
Cat=Extremism&LEARN SubCat=Extrealism iArnerica xpicked-3&item=WBC
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010) ("The primary goal of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC), led
by Fred Phelps, appears to be garnering publicity for itself and its message. For this
reason, the group directs its efforts at events that have attracted heavy news coverage, like
the deaths of soldiers killed in wars or the victims of well-publicized accidents, or at
venues, such as high schools, which are likely to generate large counter-protests and
community outrage."); Judy Keen, Funeral Protestors Say Laws Can't Silence Them, USA
TODAY, Sept. 13, 2006, at A5, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-09-
13-funeral-protests_x.htm; Sara Bonisteel, Anti-Gay Kansas Church Cancels Protests at
Funerals for Slain Amish Girls, Fox NEWS (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,217760,00.html (discussing Phelps's agreement to cancel protests in exchange
2010] 331
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Unsurprisingly, WBC's conduct has sparked enormous outrage
as well as swift responses by over half of the nation's state legislatures
to limit or ban such protests during funeral ceremonies.36 In 2006,
Congress enacted the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act which
makes any disruptive demonstration within 300 feet of a national
cemetery during a specified time before, during, and after a military
funeral a misdemeanor offense punishable by one year in prison or a
$100,000 fine.37 Following the federal example, Maryland enacted a
similar statute regulating Phelps-style demonstrations by prohibiting
"speech to a person attending a funeral, burial, memorial service, or
funeral procession that is likely to incite or produce an imminent
breach of the peace" and imposed a 100 foot buffer zone around the
burial, service, and funeral procession.38
Regrettably, the "many dangers, toils and snares"39 of threatened
criminal sanctions did little to deter the Phelps family. Fred Phelps, as
well as eleven of his children, are trained lawyers with a keen
appreciation for the publicity generated by high-profile litigation.'
for one hour of radio time on a syndicated talk show to further spread their message); see
also Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (D. Md. 2008) ("Defendants essentially
acknowledged in their testimony that their choice of military funerals was driven by the
publicity the demonstrations generated."), rev'd, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
78 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
36. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 214 & n.39 (cataloguing the twenty-eight funeral
picketing laws passed by state legislatures in response to WBC's demonstrations); Lauren
M. Miller, A Funeral For Free Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral
Picketing Acts, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1097, 1104-09 (2007) (reviewing state and federal
legislation); Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151, 161-74
(2008) (discussing variations in state funeral picketing laws).
37. Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat. 387
(2006) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1387 (2006)); see also 5 Arrested
for Attacks on Anti-Gay Protesters at Military Funeral, FOX NEWS (May 22, 2006),
http://www.fox news.com/story/0,2933,196487,00.html ("The protests by the Kansas church
group led by the Rev. Fred Phelps prompted the U.S. House of Representatives earlier
this month to pass a measure to restrict demonstrations at military funerals at federal
burial grounds. The measure urged states to pass similar legislation to cover nonfederal
cemeteries, and more than a dozen states are considering laws aimed at funeral
protesters.").
38. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); see also Jason M.
Dorsky, Note, A New Battleground for Free Speech: The Impact of Snyder v. Phelps, 7
PIERCE L. REV. 235, 238-39 (2009) (discussing the Maryland statute and noting that the
regulation was modeled after the " 'fighting words' exception from Chaplinksy v. New
Hampshire: words 'which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace'" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942))).
39. John Newton, Amazing Grace! How Sweet the Sound, in THE BAPTlST HYMNAL
330 (Convention Press 1991) (1779) (beloved hymn frequently sung at church funerals).
40. See John Blake, "Most Hated" Anti-gay Preacher Once Fought for Civil Rights,
CNN (May 14, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/05/hate.preacher/index.html?
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Before embarking on his anti-gay crusade, Pastor Phelps gained
notoriety (and reportedly very large fees) as an aggressive civil rights
attorney in Kansas filing frequent discrimination lawsuits against local
businesses on behalf of African Americans.41 Phelps was later
disbarred for "using his position as a lawyer as a weapon,"42 but his
litigious legacy endures in a new, albeit twisted form: his adult
children, now licensed attorneys themselves, form a family law firm43
and personally file lawsuits across the nation to promote, defend, and
even fund" WBC's picketing activities.4 5 Margie Phelps and Shirley
section=cnn latest. Fred Phelps graduated from Washburn University School of Law in
1964. See Fred Mann, Westboro Baptist Church: Road to Westboro, WITCHITA EAGLE,
Apr. 2, 2006, at Al, available at America's Newspapers, Record No. 060430169.
41. See Blake, supra note 40.
42. State v. Phelps, 598 P.2d 180, 186-87 (Kan. 1979) (per curiam); see also Intelligence
Files: Fred Phelps, S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/
intelligence-files/profiles/fred-phelps (last visited Nov. 9, 2010) ("Since 1951, Phelps has
been arrested repeatedly for assault, battery, threats, trespassing, disorderly conduct, and
contempt of court. He has been convicted four times, as well as disbarred, but has
successfully avoided prison.").
43. S. Poverty Law Ctr., supra note 16 at 60 ("[Eleven] of Fred Phelps, Sr.'s children
followed in their father's footsteps by becoming attorneys. Nine of these remain loyal to
their father, working for Phelps Chartered, the family firm. Although Fred Phelps, Sr. has
been barred from practicing law in Kansas for 'using his position as a lawyer as a weapon,'
Kansas v. Phelps, 598 P.2d 180, 185 (Kan. 1979), some of his children carry on his
campaign of abusive litigation....").
44. Fred Phelps's children, most notably daughters Shirley Phelps-Roper and Margie
Phelps, vigorously seek attorney's fees and other damages following the various lawsuits
they personally file and defend. See, e.g., Sean Gregory, The Price of Free Speech, TIME,
Oct. 4, 2010, at 30, 32 (explaining that after the Phelpses won their appeal in Snyder, the
court ordered Albert Snyder to pay the Phelpses $16,510 in legal fees, prompting much
public outrage); Neb. to Foot Phelps' Legal Fees, TOPEKA CAP.-J., (Sept. 3, 2010, 4:04
PM), http://cjonline.com/news/local/2010-09-03/neb -tojfoot-phelps_1egal-fees (reporting
that the Phelpses were awarded $8,000 in legal fees, to be paid by taxpayers, after the
Phelpses successfully challenged a Nebraska flag-desecration law they allegedly violated
during one of their funeral protests); S. Poverty Law Ctr., A City Held Hostage,
INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2001, at 19, 25, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/a-city-held-hostage/fred-phelps-
timel (describing a $7 million suit filed by Phelps against the city of Topeka for its alleged
failure to provide WBC picketers adequate protection).
45. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Bruning, No. 4:10CV3131, 2010 WL 2723202, at *1-3 (D.
Neb. July 6, 2010) (enjoining enforcement of a Nebraska flag desecration statute after
Phelps-Roper challenged the law on First Amendment grounds following a funeral
protest); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977-78 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (challenging a
Kentucky funeral protest statute specifically aimed at WBC and granting preliminary
injunction in favor of WBC), rev'd on other grounds, McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d
591(6th Cir. 2010); Hockenbarger v. Schisseur, No. 98-3342-DES, 1998 WL 918846, at *1-
2, *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1998) (denying habeas petition for WBC picketer charged with
misdemeanor); State v. Phelps, 967 P.2d 304, 311-12 (Kan. 1998) (reviewing criminal
charges against Fred Phelps); S. Poverty Law Ctr., A City Held Hostage, INTELLIGENCE
REP., Spring 2001, at 19, 21, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/
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Phelps-Roper, Phelps's daughters and WBC's lead attorneys, have
been embroiled in litigation for years suing various individuals and
local governments opposed to their activities and challenging a range
of state funeral protest statutes across the country.' The outcome of
the Phelpses' high-profile legal battles is often uncertain, but the
publicity is guaranteed.
II. A UNIQUELY "CIVIL" RESPONSE TO WBC: SNYDER V. PHELPS
In March of 2006, two uniformed United States Marines
appeared at the doorstep of Albert Snyder's home to deliver the
solemn message military families fear most: Snyder's son, Marine
Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder, had fallen in the line of duty
while fighting in Iraq.4 7 Snyder planned to put his son to rest at a
burial ceremony at St. John's Catholic Church in Westminster,
Maryland.48 The grieving father placed the customary obituary notices
in the local papers, no doubt anticipating that news of Matthew's
death would prompt friends and family to gather at the graveside to
intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/a-city-held-hostage?page=0,1 (discussing
various retaliatory civil lawsuits filed by the Phelps against police officers, prosecutors, and
private citizens who filed criminal complaints arising from WBC's protests); S. Poverty
Law Ctr., A City Held Hostage, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2001, at 19, 20-26, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-allissues/ 2001/spring/a-
city-held-hostage/fred-phelps-timel (outlining WBC's activities and discussing abusive
lawsuits filed by the Phelps family).
46. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 689, 694 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding
Missouri statute prohibiting funeral protests should be preliminarily enjoined on First
Amendment grounds); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 2008 FED App. 0312P at 1, 14, 539
F.3d 356, 358, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding Ohio statute prohibiting funeral pickets did not
violate the First Amendment); Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1997)
(dismissing Kansas anti-stalking statute claim and affirming finding that "plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the telefacsimile amendment to the Kansas Telephone Harassment
Statute"); Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo., No. 4:09-CV-1298 CDP, 2010 WL
3614182, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2010) (finding ordinance prohibiting protesting and
picketing within 300 feet of a funeral unconstitutional); Bruning, 2010 WL 2723202, at *1-
3 (entering restraining order regarding enforcement of flag desecration statute); S. Poverty
Law Ctr., A City Held Hostage, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2001, at 19, 25, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/a-
city-held-hostage/fred-phelps-timel (describing a $7 million suit filed by Phelps against the
city of Topeka for its alleged failure to provide WBC picketers adequate protection);
Westboro Baptist Church: Pickets Inspire Legislation and Legal Action, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.adl.org/learn/ext-us/WBC/legislation.asp?LEARN
Cat=Extremism&LEARNSubCat=Extremismin_- America&xpicked=3&item=WBC
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010) (describing lawsuits in Ohio, Maryland, and Nebraska).
47. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010)
(No. 09-751).
48. Id.
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celebrate his son's life and pay their final respects.49 Unbeknownst to
Snyder, however, news of the upcoming ceremony also reached Fred
Phelps in Topeka, and WBC soon issued its own press release
announcing its intention to pack up its arsenal of signs and slogans
and travel to Maryland to picket Matthew's funeral "in order to
publicize their message of God's hatred of America for its tolerance
of homosexuality . .. whether they want to hear it or not."50
Aware of Maryland's newly minted funeral protest statute and
other local ordinances, Phelps contacted law enforcement in advance
and WBC fully complied with police instructions to keep its distance
from the church during the ceremony."' On the day of the funeral,
Fred Phelps, his daughters, and four of his grandchildren took to the
streets in their now familiar routine with signs proclaiming "Fag
Troops," "God Hates You," and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers."52
Although he did not see the signs during the ceremony, Albert
Snyder was shocked and sickened when he saw footage of the
Phelpses' protests later that evening on a television news report." In
Snyder's view, the Phelpses had capitalized on his family's grief and
transformed the solemnity of a patriot's burial into a "media circus
for their benefit."5 4 Even after returning home to Topeka, the Phelps
family continued its usurpation of Matthew's memorial. Phelps-Roper
penned a self-styled "epic" about Matthew's death entitled "The
Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder" that claimed
Matthew's Catholic parents had "raised him for the devil," that their
son had fought for "the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that
is in lock step with his evil, wicked and sinful manner of life," and that
God "killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity
to preach His words to ... the whorehouse called St. John Catholic
Church."" After running an internet search for his son's name, Albert
Snyder came across the "epic" on the godhatesfags.com website and
became physically ill."
In June 2006, Albert Snyder filed a complaint in United States
District Court for the District of Maryland against WBC and
members of the Phelps family alleging five tort claims under
49. Id.
50. Id. at 211-12.
51. Id. at 212.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 224-25.
56. Id. at 212-13.
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Maryland law: (1) defamation, (2) intrusion upon seclusion, (3)
publicity given to private life, (4) intentional infliction of emotional
distress ("IED"), and (5) civil conspiracy." The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the defamation 8 and
publicity claims;59 however, the parties proceeded to trial on the three
remaining claims of IIED, intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy.'
Throughout the litigation, the Phelpses contended that their actions
were "entitled to absolute First Amendment protection.""1 However,
the district court permitted the tort claims to reach the jury,
emphasizing that the First Amendment "does not afford absolute
protection to individuals committing acts directed at other private
individuals" and that "[constitutional] protection of particular types
of speech must be balanced against a state's interest in protecting its
residents from wrongful injury."6 2 Following a trial on the merits, a
jury found that WBC's outrageous conduct during the funeral was
intentionally designed to inflict emotional distress upon the plaintiff
and that its actions constituted tortious intrusion upon the seclusion
of the Snyder family.63 Accordingly, the jury returned a plaintiff's
verdict on all counts, awarding Snyder a total of $10.9 million in both
compensatory and punitive damages.' The district court later
remitted the total award to $5 million," but not before Phelps-Roper
found a way to turn their misfortune into additional publicity: WBC
quickly issued a press release entitled "Thank God for the 10.9
Million Dollar Verdict!" warning that the jury's decision further
condemned a "Doomed America."66
57. Id. at 212.
58. The district court held that Snyder's defamation claim failed because "the content
of the 'epic' posted on the church's website was essentially Phelps-Roper's religious
opinion and would not realistically tend to expose Snyder to public hatred or scorn."
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572-73 (D. Md. 2008), rev'd, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
59. As to the publicity given to private life claim, the district court held that "no
private information was made public" by WBC because they "learned that Snyder was
divorced and that his son was Catholic from the obituary in the newspaper." Id. at 573. As
the information about the family was already a matter of public record, Snyder's claim
failed because "any publication of this information would not be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." Id.
60. Id. at 573.
61. Id. at 576.
62. Id. at 570 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 571.
65. Id.
66. Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 17.
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Apparently, the Phelpses' doomsday vision failed to materialize
because WBC soon sought a far more earthly method of escaping
liability. In 2008, the defendants filed an appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that sought reversal as
a matter of law.67 In their appellate briefs to the court, the Phelpses'
argument had a narrow focus: the judgment below violated their First
Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. 6
Notably absent was any contention that the evidence was insufficient
to warrant liability for the torts of IIED, intrusion upon seclusion,
and conspiracy as a matter of law.69 Although the court acknowledged
that the sufficiency issue was raised by amicus, 0 the majority refused
to consider it as a possible ground for reversal stating that
"defendants and their counsel have exercised their discretion and
voluntarily waived the sufficiency issue."" Moreover, the majority
specifically rejected any contention that jurisprudential concerns
obligated the court to consider non-constitutional grounds for
decision, arguing that "[blecause the sufficiency of the evidence issue
was waived, the Ashwander principle-that a court should not 'decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary'-is
inapplicable here" and therefore "resolution of the First Amendment
issues is absolutely necessary, as it is the sole appropriate means for
disposing of this appeal."72
In addressing the merits of the Phelpses' constitutional claims,"
the court of appeals first considered whether the content of the
67. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395
(U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
68. Brief of Appellant at 9-31, Snyder, 580 F.3d 206 (No. 08-1026).
69. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 216.
70. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 12, at 15-30.
71. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 216. As explained in more detail infra at Part IV, Judge Shedd,
in a concurring opinion, argued that the court should have reversed on the basis of the
insufficiency argument raised by amicus. Id. However, the majority replied by stating
"[w]e respectfully reject our good friend's reliance on the amicus contention, because the
evidentiary issue has plainly been waived by the only party entitled to pursue it. As a
result, the First Amendment contention must be addressed." Id.
72. Id. at n.9 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
73. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the defendant's claim that the
district court's jury instructions were in error because they permitted the jury to decide
matters of law regarding the applicability of the First Amendment. Id. at 217. The court
held that the district court's instruction was in error because it left to the jury preliminary
questions of law regarding the nature of the speech involved in this case, questions that
should have been decided by the court. Id. at 221. The court concluded, "At the least,
therefore, the judgment must be vacated and a new trial awarded, in that Instruction No.
21 authorized the jury to determine a purely legal issue, namely, the scope of protection
afforded to speech under the First Amendment." Id.
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defendant's protest signs involved speech protected by the First
Amendment.74 The court's analysis began with the recognition that
"tort liability under state law, even in the context of litigation
between private parties, is circumscribed by the First Amendment.""
Relying heavily on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,"6 the court explained that even
though the defendant's signs targeted a private rather than a public
figure, the First Amendment nonetheless protected the speech at
issue here because it regarded matters of public concern and involved
"rhetorical statements employing 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language.' "78 The protest signs may have employed vulgar and
offensive phrases, but the slogans nevertheless regarded
constitutionally protected matters of public concern such as
homosexuality and deteriorating national morality.79
The court next addressed whether the language employed in the
"epic" was entitled to First Amendment protections so as to preclude
civil tort liability."o Although the court acknowledged that the epic
posed a closer question (because the title of the epic, unlike the
slogans on the signs, referred to Matthew Snyder specifically by
name), the court nevertheless held that the epic was also worthy of
constitutional protection because it involved rhetorical language on
issues of public concern and did not assert verifiable facts about
Matthew Snyder or his family." The court stated that the epic
"cannot be divorced from the general context of the funeral protest"
but rather was similarly "patterned after the hyperbolic and figurative
language used on the various signs ... which would not lead the
reasonable reader to expect actual facts about Snyder or his son to be
asserted therein."' As tort liability cannot attach to such
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. at 217 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)).
76. 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment protects speech
regarding matters of public concern that is not "susceptible of being proved true or false").
77. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974) (concluding that
although the First Amendment protects speech regarding public figures from tort liability,
the rule does not extend to speech regarding private figures).
78. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 220.
79. Id. at 223. The court went on to hold that the defendants' speech was also
protected because "a reasonable reader would not interpret the signs that could be
perceived as including verifiable facts, such as 'Fag Troops' ... as asserting actual facts
about Snyder or his son," but rather constituted "hyperbolic rhetoric designed to spark
controversy and debate." Id.
80. Id. at 224.
81. Id. at 224-25.
82. Id. at 225.
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constitutionally protected speech, the court of appeals concluded that
the judgment of the district court must be reversed.83
In a remarkably thoughtful and thorough concurring opinion,
Judge Shedd argued that the majority's extended constitutional
analysis was unnecessary because Snyder had failed to prove at the
trial level that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient
evidence.' As non-constitutional grounds existed to dispose of this
appeal, Judge Shedd would not have reached the First Amendment
issues, but would have reversed on the issue of sufficiency raised by
amicus. 5 What follows picks up where Judge Shedd left off by
examining in some detail the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
exploring the operative rationales supporting the avoidance doctrine,
and arguing that prudence demanded application of the doctrine in
Snyder.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
The powers of the federal judiciary are limited by a series of
justiciability doctrines that derive from the "case and controversy"
requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution.8 6 Among
these self-imposed limits on judicial decision-making are the
constitutional requirements of standing, the prohibition on advisory
opinions, and the political question doctrine. These doctrines are
imposed in order to further certain jurisprudential virtues such as
separation of powers, the conservation of judicial resources, and the
preservation of the institutional legitimacy of the federal courts
(notably populated by unelected federal judges") through careful,
calculated, and limited use of judicial review.89 The doctrine of
constitutional avoidance cautions federal courts to avoid deciding
constitutional questions when other non-constitutional grounds exist
83. Id. at 226.
84. Id. at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring) ("Although I agree with the majority that the
judgment below must be reversed ... I would hold that Snyder failed to prove at trial
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on any of his tort claims. Because the appeal
can be decided on this non-constitutional basis, I would not reach the First Amendment
issue addressed by the majority.").
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 49-53.
87. see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 49-53; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2.12 -2.15 (7th ed. 2004).
88. See Healy, supra note 3, at 924-25.
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 49-53; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87,
§§ 2.12 -2.15.
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for disposing of the case. 0 The principle underlying avoidance has
early roots. In 1833, Justice Marshall, the preeminent architect of
judicial review,9 1 urged caution in reaching decisions of constitutional
magnitude, particularly when separation of powers was implicated.'
However, the avoidance doctrine was most famously articulated by
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority." Brandeis "characterized judicial review ... as a
grave and delicate power for use by fallible, human judges only when
its use cannot conscientiously be avoided." 94 In Ashwander, Brandeis
described a set of prudential rules governing "the practice in
constitutional cases"95 including the following:
1. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last
resort . ... ' "96
2. "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' "9'
90. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (endorsing the "general rule of
constitutional avoidance" and calling it "the 'older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on
questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable' " (quoting Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring))); Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (describing the "fundamental principle of
judicial restraint that courts should neither 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it' nor 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied' " (quoting Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring))); Erickson v.
United States, 976 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Fundamental principles of judicial
restraint require federal courts to consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision prior to
reaching constitutional questions.... Thus, a federal court should decide constitutional
questions only when it is impossible to dispose of the case on some other ground.");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 53.
91. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); CHEMERINSKY, supra note
5, at 39-47.
92. See Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (stating that if
constitutional questions "become indispensably necessary to the case," they must be
addressed, but "if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the
legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and
wantonly assailed").
93. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
94. Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1015-16.
95. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 346 (internal citations omitted).
97. Id. at 346-47 (internal citations omitted).
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3. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.' "98
4. "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter."99
In the decades that followed, the avoidance doctrine as
articulated in Ashwander has become an integral part of the
jurisprudential canon." Justice Stevens called Brandeis' concurring
opinion "one of the most respected opinions ever written by a
Member of this Court."o' Further, the rule that courts should only
consider a constitutional basis of decision as a last resort has received
substantial scholarly support." Bickel has argued persuasively that
98. Id. at 347 (internal citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (unanimously endorsing the
"general rule of constitutional avoidance" as articulated in Ashwander); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling the
avoidance doctrine "deeply rooted" and a "fundamental rule of judicial restraint"
(quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984))); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) ("It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint,
however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity
of deciding them."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) ("The best teaching of this
Court's experience admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of
the strictest necessity." (quoting Parker v. Cnty. of L.A., 338 U.S. 327, 333 (1949)));
Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572 (1947) ("Time and experience have given
[the avoidance doctrine] sanction. They have also verified ... that the choice was wisely
made."); Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one
doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it
is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is
unavoidable."); Bell AtI. Md., Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 212 F.3d 863, 866 (4th Cir.
2000) ("[B]y deciding the constitutional question of preemption in advance of considering
the state law questions upon which the case might have been disposed of, the district court
committed reversible error."); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2, passim (discussing and
critiquing several important cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the avoidance
doctrine); Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49
OR. L. REV. 125, 182 (1970) ("The logic of constitutional law demands that
nonconstitutional issues be disposed of first, state constitutional issues second, and federal
constitutional issues last.").
101. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111-98 (advocating the "passive virtues" of
judicial restraint including adherence to the avoidance doctrine); LouIs LUSKY, OUR
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the avoidance doctrine is essential to the preservation of the
creditability of the federal courts, and the power of unelected federal
judges, in our political system.03 Unlike the executive branch, which
wields the power of the sword, or the legislative branch, which may
rely on the power of the purse, the judicial branch has little power to
enforce its rulings except through the cooperation of the coordinate
branches, the raw mythos of its institutional credibility, and the
general public's willingness to accept the court's wisdom as
authoritative." Thus, judicial restraint generally, and the avoidance
doctrine particularly, promote the conservation of the judiciary's
limited political capital and ensure the continued vitality of the "least
dangerous" branch.' If constitutional rulings are frequent and
haphazard, courts may jeopardize the public's widespread acceptance
of its decisions, particularly on controversial topics.106 In a democracy
with interests as diverse as our own, the resolution of difficult and
contested public policy questions requires healthy public debate and
NINE TRIBUNES (1993) (arguing for a limited scope of judicial review); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME 3-60 (1999) (advocating a judicial policy of "democracy-promoting
minimalism"); Trevor W. Morrison, supra note 20, at 1202-08 (2006) (describing the
underlying rationales and arguments for the avoidance canon). But see KLOPPENBERG,
supra note 2, passim (arguing that the avoidance doctrine has been implemented in
inconsistent and manipulative ways by courts eager to reach a particular result).
103. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 201-68; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 39 (1989) (noting that scholars "contend that federal courts generally
depend on the other branches to voluntarily comply with judicial orders and that such
acquiescence depends on the judiciary's credibility"); Healy, supra note 3, at 924-25
("Because federal judges are not elected, they derive their legitimacy from the people's
acceptance of their decisions.... Therefore, in order to maintain their legitimacy and
credibility, courts should exercise judicial review only when absolutely necessary.").
104. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at vi (" 'Whoever attentively considers the different
departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be the least in capacity
to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend on the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.'"
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton))).
105. Id.; see also Paul A. Freund, Introduction to ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS xvii (1957) (noting that judicial
restraint preserved the judiciary's credibility due to "the indispensability of husbanding
what powers one had, of keeping within bounds if action is not to outrun wisdom").
106. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 240; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review,
91 MICH. L. REV. 577,681 (1993).
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even compromise, yet the finality of constitutional rulings"o' often cuts
short political solutions.' By observing the passive virtues of the
avoidance doctrine, however, courts can carefully calculate the timing
and propriety of a difficult or unpopular constitutional decision to
ensure a receptive reaction. 109 Even more importantly, the avoidance
doctrine protects against a "policy, of accelerated decision" which
could render important individual rights less certain and less stable.110
If lower federal courts are too eager to reach constitutional questions
unnecessarily, the resulting proliferation of variable constitutional
interpretations would lead to a lack of uniformity in the protection
and qualification of constitutionally protected rights. 1 ' Thus, there
are powerful interests at stake in preserving the essential functions of
a vibrant judiciary that should not be put at risk by unnecessary
constitutional decision-making.
The rationales supporting the avoidance principle are not
without critics. First, some commentators dismiss as overstated the
concerns about judicial credibility.'12 After all, in recent years, the
107. See Healy, supra note 3, at 925-26 (explaining that "constitutional rulings are final
in a way that other rulings are not" because judicial interpretations of constitutional
principles can only be overruled by the coordinate branches through the "notoriously
difficult" amendment process).
108. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 147 ("[T]he 'tendency of a common and easy resort
to this great function [of judicial review] ... is to dwarf the political capacity of the people,
and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.' " (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER,
JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901))); Healy, supra note 3, at 927; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1996). Cass Sunstein is described as
"[t]he most prominent contemporary defender and refiner of the passive virtues." Justin
R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 134 (2009). Sunstein argues in
favor of a democracy-promoting "judicial minimalism" and advocates such an approach
particularly "when the Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity about which many
people feel deeply and on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise)." Sunstein,
supra at 7-8. Sunstein argues that courts should promote public debate and majoritarian
decision-making by avoiding (when possible) entangling themselves in such highly
contested issues "first because courts may resolve the relevant issues incorrectly, and
second because courts may be ineffective or create serious problems even if their answers
are right." Id. at 8.
109. See Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572 n.38 (1947) ("It is not without
significance for the [avoidance] policy's validity that the periods when the power [of
judicial review] has been exercised most readily and broadly have been the ones in which
this Court and the institution of judicial review have had their stormiest experiences.");
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111-98; Friedman, supra note 106, at 681; Healy, supra note 3, at
924-25.
110. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 572; Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1034.
111. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983) (emphasizing the need for
"doctrinal consistency" through uniformity in federal law); Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at
1034.
112. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103, at 45-46 n.3 ("[C]onserving judicial
credibility should not be a primary objective in constitutional interpretation.").
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Supreme Court has successfully weathered political firestorms
following highly polarizing decisions such as Bush v. Gore"3 with its
institutional credibility intact.'14 Others argue that rigid adherence to
avoidance techniques, particularly by the Supreme Court, retards the
evolution of constitutional rights by postponing indefinitely judicial
review of thorny constitutional questions."' Yet even the critics of
avoidance do not propose abandoning the doctrine completely.
Rather, they challenge the wisdom of absolute adherence to the
avoidance principle in the face of needed clarification of
constitutional principles and expansion of minority rights.116 Further,
their criticisms are usually levied directly at the United States
Supreme Court,"' an institution possessing not only more prestige
than lower federal courts, but also a mandate to promote uniformity
in federal constitutional law by saying with finality "what the law
is.""' Thus, the argument condemning an inflexible policy of absolute
avoidance by the Supreme Court has merit, but it does little to
undermine the general "presumption1 9  against unnecessary
constitutional rulings" for lower federal courts in the absence of
compelling, clearly articulated reasons.120
113. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
114. See Healy, supra note 3, at 926; Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore
on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 35-36
(2001) (summarizing survey data on public perceptions of the Court following the Bush v.
Gore decision ending the Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election and noting "the
net effect on the public's evaluation of the Court was essentially nil; increases in negative
evaluations were almost exactly offset by increases in positive evaluations").
115. See generally KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2 (discussing and critiquing the Supreme
Court's "sidestepping" of important constitutional questions through inconsistent
invocations of the avoidance doctrine).
116. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310 (1979) ("One reason ... for
allowing courts to review legislation is that minority groups and unpopular points of view
may not be adequately represented in the processes of democratic decisionmaking.");
Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1041.
117. See generally KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2 (critiquing the avoidance doctrine, but
focusing that critique on the United States Supreme Court's use of avoidance techniques).
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). The United States
Supreme Court has long declared itself to be the "ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
119. In essence, interpreting the avoidance principle as a kind of presumption against
constitutional decision-making absent necessity seems already inherent in the concept of a
"prudential" doctrine. See Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1025 (describing the last resort
rule as "largely prudential").
120. Healy, supra note 3, at 927; see also Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1034
("Alternatively, proliferation of federal constitutional law may lead to nonuniformity in
protection of federal interests. The Supreme Court may better achieve uniformity in
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Moreover, one might question whether encouraging courts to
reach out and tackle complex constitutional questions in the absence
of strict necessity is really boon or bane for the expansion of minority
rights. As one commentator explained, when federal courts "reach
out to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily, they do not
always reach decisions that expand the universe of recognized rights"
but instead often "use the opportunity to contain the body of
recognized rights and to deny the existence of new rights." 12' Thus,
those that justify "avoiding" avoidance as a means to ensure the
continued evolution of minority rights in our majoritarian system may
find themselves disheartened by the results. Regardless of political
orientation, however, one thing is clear: the decision to render a
constitutional adjudication in a given case is a solemn and weighty
judicial task that should not be taken up capriciously. As explained
more fully below, it is for this reason that it should be the
responsibility of the court and the court alone, even when faced with
aggressive litigants, to control determinations of when constitutional
rulings become a necessity.
IV. AVOIDING A CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION IN SNYDER V. PHELPS
Against this theoretical backdrop, the majority's refusal to
consider non-constitutional grounds to dispose of the appeal in
Snyder becomes all the more troubling. The majority reasoned that it
was "absolutely necessary" to address the constitutional question
because the defendants chose not to argue that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict, thereby waiving the issue on
appeal. 22 What follows argues that the majority was unjustified in
refusing to address the non-constitutional sufficiency issue simply
because the Phelpses pressed only the constitutional question in their
federal law if it addresses constitutional issues but urges the lower federal courts and state
courts faced with federal constitutional questions to use avoidance techniques."); id. at
1066 ("Whatever their value choices, courts should offer reasoned explanations of
necessity. If a court relies on the last resort rule to avoid a constitutional issue, it should do
so expressly and explain its decision. ... If a court reaches a constitutional issue when
nonconstitutional grounds remain, it should similarly explain why that action was
appropriate.").
121. Healy, supra note 3, at 928-30 (citing examples where a conservative Court
restricted rather than expanded rights when it reached out to tackle a difficult
constitutional question and cautioning that "there is nothing uniquely liberal about
judicial activism"); see also Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at Al (detailing the Court's recent conservative activism as
compared with earlier eras).
122. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395
(U.S. Mar. 8,2010) (No. 09-751).
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briefs and explains why avoidance was the most prudent course of
action under the facts and circumstances of this case.
A. The Insufficiency of Snyder's Tort Claims Under Maryland Law
First, Snyder failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
tort claims under Maryland law, thus non-constitutional grounds of
decision existed to dispose of this appeal. Snyder's substantive claims
alleged that the Phelpses' conduct at the funeral protest and the
subsequent posting of the "epic" on the WBC website constituted
both the tort of "invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion" and
the tort of "intentional infliction of emotional distress." 123 However, a
survey of Maryland case law reveals that the facts Snyder alleged are
insufficient to warrant a finding of civil liability on either claim. Thus,
the majority could have resolved this case on purely non-
constitutional grounds and avoided a constitutional ruling condoning
the Phelpses' outrageous conduct as protected speech.
Under Maryland law, the tort of "intrusion" requires a showing
that the defendant has committed an act that interferes "into a private
place or the invasion of a private seclusion that the plaintiff has
thrown about his person."124 Where Maryland courts have found
"intrusion," the alleged action almost always involves some type of
physical invasion of a plaintiff's private home or other protected area,
such as peering into windows, or eavesdropping on private
conversations." The courts have repeatedly stated that "there is no
liability for observing [the plaintiff] in public places, since he is not
then in seclusion."l 26 Further, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
held there is no "intrusion" where no private facts are revealed,
stating "[t]he plaintiff cannot complain when ... publicity is given to
matters such as the date of his birth or marriage, or his military
service record, which are a matter of public record, and open to
public inspection."127 Thus, as Judge Shedd explained, Snyder's claim
fails as a matter of law: "Phelps did not 'intrude' or 'pry' upon any
private seclusion" during the funeral protest because the
demonstration occurred on a public street, the Phelpses never
disrupted the ceremony itself, and Snyder admitted at trial he did not
123. Id.
124. Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. App. 2000).
125. See Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421, 425-26 (Md. 1976).
126. Furman, 744 A.2d at 586; Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101,
1116-17 (Md. App. 1986).
127. Hollander, 351 A.2d at 426.
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even see the signs until he viewed a news report on television.128
Neither could the posting of the "epic" give rise to a claim of
"intrusion" under Maryland law because "[i]n posting the 'epic', the
Phelps did not do anything to direct it to Snyder's attention, such as
email or transmit it to him."129 Rather, Snyder only discovered the
epic by running a Google search and browsing WBC's website to find
the posting.3 0
Similarly, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support a claim for IIED under Maryland law.'3 ' In order to sustain a
claim for IIED in Maryland, the plaintiff must meet a substantial
burden, as courts have held that the tort "is rarely viable, and is to be
used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that includes truly
outrageous conduct."13 2 The plaintiff must show that the defendant's
intentional conduct was "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."'33 Further, the plaintiff
must show that the conduct caused "severe" emotional distress, such
as when a defendant encourages another to commit suicide or
deliberately gives a sexual partner a sexually transmitted disease.134
As Judge Shedd argued, the evidence clearly failed to establish that
the Phelpses' funeral protest, which did not disturb the funeral
procession and which Snyder did not even personally witness during
the funeral, could support a claim for IIED as a matter of law.'
Thus, reversal was warranted on non-constitutional grounds that
would allow the court to avoid ruling unnecessarily on the First
Amendment questions pressed by the Phelpses.
128. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 230 (Shedd, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 231.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 232.
132. Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 319 (Md. App. 1995).
Maryland courts have also stated the requirements for proving the tort of IIED are
"'rigorous' " and rarely satisfied. Ky. Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607
A.2d 8, 11 (Md. 1992) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 60-
61 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1216 (Md. 1992) (noting that
Maryland courts have only rarely upheld claims for IIED and stating "recovery [for IIED]
will be meted out sparingly").
133. Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. App. 1986).
134. See B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Md. 1988); Young v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1278 (Md. 1985).
135. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 232-33.
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B. The Court Was Permitted to Rely on Non-Constitutional Grounds
Raised Solely by Amicus Curiae
Secondly, although the Phelpses only addressed constitutional
defenses in their appellate briefs, the insufficiency of Snyder's
underlying tort claims was in fact raised by amicus curiae. Thus, a
legal analysis of the issue that showed Snyder failed to present
sufficient evidence to support his claims as a matter of law was before
the court, providing the court with non-constitutional grounds for
decision. Further, the fact that insufficiency was raised solely by
amicus and not by the appellants did not oblige the court to reach the
constitutional issues pressed by the Phelpses. In rejecting Justice
Shedd's contention that the court should dispose of this case on the
non-constitutional grounds outlined above, the Snyder majority
maintained that precedent precluded the court from reaching an issue
raised solely by an amicus brief and erroneously concluded that "the
resolution of the First Amendment issues is absolutely necessary, as it
is the sole appropriate means for disposing of this appeal."' On the
contrary, ample precedent supports the view that the court was free
to base its decision on an issue raised only by amicus, to raise the
issue sua sponte, or to request further briefing on the issue.'
Although courts often decline to consider grounds for decision
raised solely by amici for prudential or fairness reasons, 39 federal
136. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 12, at 15-30.
137. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217 (majority opinion).
138. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (noting that the Court
may take up contentions raised only by amicus); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)
(addressing an issue raised solely by amicus and not by petitioner because "that question is
not foreign to the parties" and because the Court's "sua sponte consideration ... is far
from novel"); Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that although the
non-constitutional basis for decision was not raised by the parties, the court would forgo a
constitutional adjudication and decide the case on the non-constitutional basis); Paul M.
Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 807, 815 (2004) (discussing the
influence of amicus briefs on the Supreme Court's opinions and describing how amicus
briefs often contain information and arguments not contained in the briefs submitted by
the parties themselves); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in
Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG.
669, 690-92 (2008) ("[J]udges at all three levels of the federal bench find amici curiae
helpful in offering new legal arguments that are absent from the parties' briefs."). Even
the appellate rules of the United States Supreme Court suggest that one of the central
purposes of permitting amicus briefs to be filed is to bring before the Court arguments and
factual matters that were not already raised by the parties. See SUP. Cr. R. 37.1 (noting the
Court finds amicus briefs more helpful when they bring "to the attention of the Court
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties").
139. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 497 (2003) (declining to
consider a constitutional issue raised by only amicus because the petitioners had not
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courts nonetheless retain the power to consider such alternatives and
have exercised that power sua sponte on multiple occasions.140 As
scholars have noted, "the Supreme Court has based some of its most
important holdings on arguments raised only in amicus briefs." 141
Perhaps the most famous example is Mapp v. Ohio,142 in which the
United States Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule applicable to
the states-a ground for decision raised not by the parties, but solely
by amicus curiae.143 Therefore, contrary to the Snyder majority's
contention, there is authority for a court to address an issue raised
only by amicus, particularly where, as here, countervailing
jurisprudential obligations are implicated."
addressed the question); Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 252 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]his
Court normally views contentions not raised in an opening brief to be waived."); United
States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 333 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n appellant and an amicus
may not split up the issues and expect the court to consider that they have all been raised
on appeal."); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the court would not address issues not raised in the opening brief in fairness to the
appellee).
140. See, e.g., U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
446 (1993) ("[W]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited
to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent
power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law." (quoting Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300; Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th
Cir. 1995) ("The normal rule of course is that the failure to raise an issue for review in the
prescribed manner constitutes a waiver. But the rule is not an absolute one and review
may proceed (even completely sua sponte) when the equities require.") (citation omitted);
Spicer, 618 F.2d at 240; see also Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 253-59
(2002) (discussing multiple examples of courts basing their decisions on arguments from
amici curiae or by raising an issue sua sponte).
141. Frost, supra note 15, at 466 (discussing noteworthy cases where the United States
Supreme Court based its rulings on arguments presented solely by amicus curiae and
citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Teague, 489 U.S. at 288, and Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
142. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
143. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3 ("Although appellant chose to urge what may have
appeared to be the surer ground for favorable disposition and did not insist that Wolf be
overruled, the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument,
did urge the Court to overrule Wolf."). Another famous example is Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938), which overturned the long established precedent of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), sua sponte, though neither party briefed or even argued
the issue. See Milani & Smith, supra note 140, at 254-55.
144. See Frost, supra note 15, at 464 ("[T]he Supreme Court has long assumed the
power to amend or add to the questions presented by the parties for resolution.
Frequently, the Court rewrites those questions to clarify, narrow, or simplify the issues
framed by the parties. On occasion, the Court has even made substantive changes to the
issues the parties ask it to review, or has added entirely new questions."); see also Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (noting that the Court may take up contentions
raised only by amicus); Spicer, 618 F.2d at 240 (finding that although the non-
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Moreover, the court retained the inherent power to raise the
sufficiency issue on its own motion or request that the parties brief
such non-constitutional grounds for decision more fully. 145 As the
Supreme Court has stated elsewhere, "a court may consider an issue
'antecedent to ... and ultimately dispositive of' the dispute before it,
even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief."146 Such
"independent power"147 has been exercised even where important
constitutional questions are in play. 48 Lastly, there was little risk of
unfairness to the appellees in this case, as Snyder specifically
addressed the sufficiency issue raised by amicus in his own reply
brief.'49 Thus, the Snyder majority was simply incorrect in concluding
that tackling the First Amendment questions pressed by the Phelpses
was "absolutely necessary" to dispose of this appeal.'s
C. The Imprudence of Permitting Litigants to Control the Court's
Constitutional Decision-Making
Third, by reaching the First Amendment issues in this case when
non-constitutional grounds for decision existed, the court
unnecessarily jeopardized its own autonomy and credibility by
handing over to the litigants, parties unconcerned with the broader
constitutional basis for decision was not raised by the parties, the court would forgo a
constitutional adjudication and decide the case on the non-constitutional basis).
145. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (stating that the Supreme
Court has "on occasion rephrased the question presented by a petitioner or requested the
parties to address an important question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari")
(citation omitted).
146. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993)
(quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)). The Court also maintained
that a court "is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties" but
may exercise an inherent power to raise another legal theory for disposing of the case on
its own motion. Id. at 446. As Justice Souter explained, "[T]he contrary conclusion would
permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court
on ... dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize
as anything but advisory." Id.
147. Id. at 446.
148. See, e.g., Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1984) (declining to
address the constitutional question presented by the parties and instead remanding the
case to consider a statutory ground for decision that the parties failed to brief); Milani &
Smith, supra note 140, passim (discussing cases where the Court has raised constitutional
issues sua sponte); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948-49
(1997) (discussing "procedural avoidance" principles and stating that "the core tenet is
that courts should order the issues for adjudication ... with an eye to obviating the need to
render constitutional rulings" and "decide an antecedent statutory issue, even one waived
by the parties, if its resolution could preclude a constitutional claim").
149. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 228 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring),
cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
150. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217 n.9 (majority opinion).
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institutional legitimacy of the judiciary and well practiced in abusive
litigation techniques,"' the power to control when a federal court
decides controversial constitutional questions. 15 2  Although the
appellant-defendants, as masters of their complaint, were free to
frame the issues on their appeal as they saw fit, the Phelpses
deliberately pressed only the constitutional question to force the
court's hand in rendering a ruling on whether the First Amendment
offered blanket protection for their outrageous conduct.153 Given the
narrow scope of the Phelpses' appellate briefs, the majority concluded
that it was "absolutely necessary" to address the Phelpses' First
Amendment contentions.'54 Thus, it was the Phelpses, and not the
court, that ultimately controlled the determination of whether a
constitutional adjudication was necessary and appropriate in this
context.
As commentators have opined, however, there is much potential
for mischief if litigants are empowered, by deliberately pressing only
constitutional claims on appeal, to manipulate the federal courts into
rendering constitutional decisions on demand.' The problem is that
"[1]itigants ... will have no incentive (and certainly no duty) to
selflessly evaluate the institutional concerns ... in order to determine
whether non-constitutional grounds merit consideration prior to a
constitutional issue."'56 This is particularly troubling where, as here,
the delicate powers of the least dangerous branch were placed in the
most dangerous hands. By repeatedly proclaiming that "God Hates
America" and "Thank God for 9[/]11,"' the Phelps family has made
its disdain and disrespect for our nation's modern institutions quite
clear. It is thus highly unlikely that the Phelps family of lawyers, with
their long and sullied history of exploiting the court system with
151. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
152. See Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1033-34; Frost, supra note 15, at 479-80.
153. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 68, at 8-9.
154. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217 n.9.
155. See Frost, supra note 15, at 479-80 ("Litigants will not always share the judiciary's
interest in promoting the values underlying the constitutional avoidance doctrine,
however. If a litigant prefers the constitutionally suspect interpretation, then that party has
no incentive to argue for the alternative, constitutionally sound construction. Indeed,
sometimes litigants turn to the courts precisely because they distrust the political branches
and believe that their interests can best be served by independent judges, who they hope
will declare the scope of their constitutional rights in the broadest possible terms. Nor will
litigants have any particular interest in avoiding conflict between the courts and the
political branches, or in cabining judicial decisions about the meaning of the Constitution.
For all of these reasons, sometimes no party will argue in favor of the most constitutionally
conservative interpretation, forcing judges to do so on their own motion.").
156. Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1033-34.
157. God Hates Fags, supra note 26.
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frivolous lawsuits,' had the best interests of the federal judiciary in
mind when framing their appeal. Entrenched in ideology and craving
publicity, the Phelpses would readily commandeer the institutional
integrity of the court to further their message and lend constitutional
legitimacy to their activities."' Therefore, it is unwise indeed to leave
to the Phelpses' discretion whether it was "absolutely necessary"160
that the court reach the constitutional questions they raised.
As courts and commentators have made clear, the discretionary
power to determine when a court should render an important and
controversial constitutional decision should rest with the court itself,
not with the litigants.' Justice Blackmun explained, "[t]he obligation
to avoid unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions does not
depend upon the parties' litigation strategy, but rather is a 'self-
imposed limitation on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction [that]
has an importance to the institution that transcends the significance of
particular controversies.' "162 In the common law tradition, an
appellate court's resolution of a particular dispute affects more than
the parties before it; rather, the decision creates binding precedent
that affects the rights and duties of all subsequent parties. 163 Courts
must therefore carefully control which of the issues raised by the
parties are properly presented for adjudication.1" Acquiescence to
158. See S. Poverty Law Ctr., supra note 16, at 60, 64; see also Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d
1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988) (imposing sanctions on the Phelps family law firm, Phelps
Chartered, for advancing "groundless and patently frivolous litigation").
159. The Phelps family has publicly stated that it is most eager to argue its case to the
United States Supreme Court because of the additional publicity that will result. See High
Court Will Hear Anti-Gay Funeral Protest Case, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.wbur.org/2010/03/08/supreme-court-funeral-2 ("Shirley Phelps-Roper, a
defendant in the lawsuit and one of Phelps' daughters, said she is pleased the case is going
to the Supreme Court. 'We get to preach to the conscience of doomed America,' she said
in an interview Monday. 'I am so excited that I can't tell you how good it is.' ").
160. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
3395 (U.S. Mar. 8,2010) (No. 09-751).
161. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 16 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Neese v. S. Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77, 78 (1955) ("[W]e follow the traditional
practice of this Court of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record
discloses other grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised before
us by the parties."); Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1033-34.
162. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 16 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455
U.S. 283, 294 (1982)).
163. See Frost, supra note 15, at 517 ("[D]ecisions by federal courts of appeals create
binding precedent that must be followed in subsequent litigation within that jurisdiction.
To preserve their role in law exposition, judges must maintain control over case
presentation when the parties fail to fully and accurately describe the meaning of legal
standards.").
164. Id.
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aggressive litigation strategy designed to force an unnecessary
constitutional ruling disrupts this process and conflicts with the core
premise of federal court jurisdiction under Article III-the resolution
of actual cases and controversies, rather than abstractions.1 65
Here, by pressing only the constitutional question, the Phelpses
were able to extract a judicial opinion (and binding precedent)
regarding whether the First Amendment immunized WBC's protest
activities from civil tort liability when such an opinion was not
required to overturn the verdict below. Moreover, as Snyder's
underlying cause of action lacked evidentiary support,'" the court did
not have the sharpest possible claims before it through which to
appraise the merits of a constitutional defense both thoroughly and
thoughtfully. Instead, flimsy state law tort claims gave rise to an
extended, abstract interpretation of First Amendment protections in
a delicate and highly controversial context. Aggressive litigation
strategy thus evoked a precipitate constitutional ruling. Prudence
dictates, however, that a court should guard far more jealously the
precious judicial capital expended in a needless constitutional
adjudication.167
D. Foreclosing an Effective Deterrent to WBC's Outrageous Conduct
Lastly, the court's eagerness to reach the First Amendment
issues in this appeal foreclosed a potentially effective deterrent to
WBC's conduct that may be preferable to the onslaught of criminal
sanctions recently imposed by state legislatures in the form of funeral
protest statutes.168 In contrast to the heavy handed criminalization of
165. See Healy, supra note 3, at 853 ("In its rejection of advisory opinions, its refusal to
adjudicate political questions, and its stringent standing requirements, the Supreme Court
traditionally has rejected the view of federal courts as roving expositors of constitutional
norms in favor of a dispute resolution model in which the exclusive function of the federal
courts-at least at the lower levels-is to decide cases and controversies.").
166. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
167. See Frost, supra note 15, at 483 ("Judicial independence, and the respect for
judicial decisionmaking that accompanies it, would be compromised if courts were
required to rule on the law as it is presented to them, rather than as they believe it to be.
Life tenure and salary protection ensure that federal judges cannot be threatened or
coerced by litigants who want them to ignore specific statutes or interpret constitutional
provisions as the litigants prefer. Yet litigants could accomplish the same result simply by
omitting sources, claims, and arguments if courts were not free to raise overlooked
statutes or adopt new interpretations of the law they are asked to apply. Furthermore, if
judges are not permitted to question litigants' articulation of the law, then courts can be
co-opted by litigants seeking to benefit from the credibility of a judicial decision that
describes the law as they see it.").
168. See, e.g., John Loran Kiel, Jr., Crossing the Line: Reconciling the Right to Picket
Military Funerals with the First Amendment, 198 MIL. L. REV. 67, 79-109 (2008)
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private conduct by the state, the flexible principles of tort law are
"frequently said to preserve public order by providing a dispute
resolution mechanism when private persons believe themselves to
have been harmed by other individuals or groups."''6 At least one
scholar has advocated tort liability as a particularly well balanced and
effective remedy against WBC, arguing that "emotional distress
claims are well suited to suggest the outer limits of civil tolerance for
religious activity [and] serve socially valuable punitive and
prophylactic functions, providing vulnerable individuals with a
remedy against the most offensive and intrusive forms of religious
conduct."' Even if a claim for IIED arising out of the Phelpses'
funeral protests ultimately could not survive constitutional scrutiny,
the mere threat of civil tort liability resulting in multi-million dollar
verdicts provides a powerful private disincentive."' Bankruptcy, after
all, poses a far greater risk to WBC's continued operations
nationwide than does criminal sanction, including arrest and
incarceration.17 2
Moreover, the threat of tort liability might serve as the
preferable deterrent to the Phelpses' unique brand of outrageous
conduct as compared with the proliferation of rigid funeral protest
statutes that may sweep too broadly, over-regulating freedom of
expression in unanticipated contexts and imposing harsh criminal
penalties that have yet to pass constitutional challenge themselves.173
The threat of tort liability is a far more flexible deterrent that avoids
the need for direct state action. 7 4 Further, efforts by state legislatures
(describing various state-sponsored funeral protest statutes); Miller, supra note 36, at
1104-09 (same).
169. Howard 0. Hunter & Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the
United States, 2001 BYU L. REV. 537, 555-56 (2001).
170. Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and the
Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 381, 381 (2008).
171. See Brown, supra note 25, at 232-36.
172. See generally Anna Zwierz Messar, Note, Balancing Freedom of Speech With the
Right to Privacy: How to Legally Cope with the Funeral Protest Problem, 28 PACE L. REV.
101 (2007) (arguing that bankrupting WBC through tort verdicts may be an effective way
to stop WBC's outrageous conduct); Chris Weigant, Fred Phelps' Hatemongering and the
First Amendment, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:47 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/chris-weigant/fred-phelps-hatemongering-b-490995.html ("If the door is opened
up on lawsuits against Phelps by this case, it wouldn't take long for Phelps and his church
to be stripped of the means of traveling around the country promulgating hatred (the
group boasts it stages 40 pickets a week, and over 30,000 pickets total), because so many
people would be lining up to sue him....").
173. See Miller, supra note 36, at 1116-30; see also supra note 46 (outlining the lawsuits
filed by the Phelps family challenging, with mixed success, various state-sponsored funeral
protest statutes).
174. See Shulman, supra note 170, at 406-7.
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to criminalize Phelps-style protests at military funerals often prove
problematic.'75 Although these funeral statutes are passed in direct
reaction to WBC's activities, criminal laws cannot explicitly single out
WBC as their target.176 Further, a criminal statute must anticipate ex
ante what specific conduct will be prohibited, thereby risking an
overly inclusive regulatory regime that may burden other rights
unintentionally.177 Thus, legislatures must continually struggle to find
the right fit. In contrast, the threat of tort liability may attach ex post,
making it easier to target WBC's protests specifically and deter a
wider range of WBC's outrageous conduct potentially interfering with
private military funerals.7
However, by finding the Phelpses' funeral protests worthy of
First Amendment protection despite the paucity of facts supporting
the underlying cause of action, the court prematurely eliminated the
possibility that WBC's "picketing ministry"17 9 could ever give rise to
tort liability, even under a different, more compelling set of
underlying facts. Had the court exercised the proper restraint and
disposed of this case on non-constitutional grounds, the threat of
potential tort liability attaching to future funeral protests would
remain intact, providing a powerful private deterrent against
particularly egregious conduct by WBC.s0 Thus, in reaching a
constitutional decision unnecessarily, the court removed the privately
enforceable checks on the Phelpses' behavior that tort law otherwise
provides."8' Secure in their new found immunity from tort liability, the
Phelpses now have less incentive to avoid direct contact with
mourners during funeral ceremonies and more opportunities to inflict
emotional distress with relative impunity. As a result, future victims
of WBC's conduct have lost a uniquely flexible and effective private
deterrent that ultimately strikes a better balance between the rights of
175. See Miller, supra note 36, at 1108-30; Wells, supra note 36, at 174-233.
176. See Wells, supra note 36, at 158-59,174-233.
177. See Brown, supra note 25, at 232-33.
178. See Hunter & Price, supra note 169, at 556 ("The law of torts is a powerful
weapon in society's suppression of intolerable activities; its doctrines are flexible and
open-ended and the contours of those doctrines often are filled in by juries rather than by
legal elites. Tort law is thus extraordinarily responsive to and reflective of societal mores,
and serves a useful function in allowing persons who are harmed by another's actions to
sue to recover damages for their injuries, judged by a common-sense standard of social
tolerance.").
179. God Hates Fags, supra note 26.
180. See generally Shulman, supra note 170 (discussing tort liability as the preferable
remedy to WBC's conduct at military funerals).
181. See id.
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mourners and the rights of protestors than state sponsored criminal
alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Snyder v. Phelps represents a dangerous
abdication of the court's prudential obligation to protect and preserve
the vital functions of the judiciary in our constitutional system. By
refusing to apply the avoidance doctrine, the court effectively handed
over to the litigants the discretionary power to control if and when
the federal courts will expend precious judicial capital in deciding a
constitutional issue. As vividly exemplified in this case, however,
litigants rarely if ever have the best interests of the judiciary in mind
when they decide to press only a constitutional issue on appeal when
non-constitutional grounds for decision remain. Litigants may be
masters of their complaints, but should not be masters of the
jurisprudential discretion of the federal courts. Courts must be more
zealous than the majority in Snyder in guarding their passive virtues
from attacks by aggressive litigants.
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